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Correspondence
Reducing Legal Noise: A Comment on Clark, The Morpho-
genesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform
To the Editors:
Professor Clark, in a recent essay,' exposes the structural foundation
of the corporate tax edifice, which lies hidden beneath its rococo exterior.2
He uses this foundation to explain the growth of existing law3 and the
effects of selective changes in the existing structure.4 He then presents a
particular combination of changes as a promising reform package.5 The
proposed reform is "legal" in the sense that its objective is simplification
of the law to reduce the "legal noise" or, as economists put it, the trans-
action costs in the prevailing corporate tax culture. 6 Although Professor
Clark is worried about tax neutrality for different forms of doing busi-
ness,7 his main concern is with simplification.8
I wish to raise some questions about how Professor Clark's promising
reform package would reduce legal noise. Part I explains the details of the
package and considers whether some of its provisions are in fact necessary
to reduce legal noise. Part II then questions whether simplification would
actually result from adoption of the package. Finally, Part III drops the
requirement that the general tax culture not be altered and looks at another
reform to see what effect it would have on legal noise.
I. How Would Professor Clark's Reform Package
Reduce Legal Noise?
Professor Clark's "corporate tax culture" consists of seven principles
divided into three groups: the double tax set (principles one and two: the
separate corporate tax and the tax on distributions to shareholders); the
capital gains set (principles three, four, and five: taxing dispositions of
property at capital gains rates, the presumption that corporate distribu-
tions are dividends, and the separation of corporations and shareholders
1. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. Professor Clark prefers the baroque image, p. 97.
3. Pp. 96-135.
4. Pp. 135-52.
5. Pp. 153-61.
6. Pp. 135-37.
7. See, e.g., pp. 137, 155.
8. Pp. 135-37, 161, 161 n.241.
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such that shareholder dispositions are not affected by corporate tax at-
tributes); and the nonrecognition set (principles six and seven: treating
distributions and exchanges as nontaxable events when the shareholder's
investment undergoes little or no change, and the nonrecognition of gain
or loss to the corporation when it distributes property), The "promising"
reform package,10 to which Professor Clark devotes the last major section
of his essay, consists of three changes." First, the double tax set would
be abolished by integrating the taxation of corporations and shareholders
so that corporate income would be taxed at the shareholder's tax rate.
Distributed income would be taxed only to shareholders. Undistributed
income would be subject to a corporate withholding tax at the highest
individual tax rate, but the tax would be credited against the share-
holder's tax when the income was reported on the shareholder's return.
Undistributed income could be allocated to the shareholders by the cor-
poration. This allocated income would be reported by the shareholder
in the year earned by the corporation; such income, reduced by the with-
holding tax, would be added to the shareholder's basis. Unallocated in-
come would be reported by the shareholder when and if distributed in
a later year.' 2 Second, preferential capital gains rates would be abolished,1 3
and, third, appreciation or depreciation in corporate property would be
recognized when the property was distributed. 14
Not all of these elements of the reform package are essential to reduce
the legal noise with which Professor Clark is most concerned. Integration
of the taxation of corporations and shareholders would clearly make the
major contribution to reducing the decibel count. The incentive to dis-
guise dividends (as salary or rent, for example) would be eliminated, be-
cause dividends would not be doubly taxed.'5 The incentive to retain cor-
porate income would be ended and with it the need for accumulated
earnings and personal holding company taxes, because retained earnings
would be taxed at the highest individual tax rate.16 Subchapter S election
would be almost irrelevant, for corporate income would not be subjected
to a greater burden than that on partnership income, with the exception
that unallocated income would be taxed at the highest individual tax
rate prior to distribution.' 7 The double taxation of corporate sales, dealt
with in section 337, would no longer be a problem, because corporate in-
9. Pp. 96, 153. For more thorough discussions of the principles, see pp. 97-104 (double
tax set), 97-117 (capital gains set), 117-35 (nonrecognition set).
10. P. 94.
11. Pp. 153-61.
12. This method of integrating the taxation of corporations and shareholders is similar
to that proposed by the Canadian Carter Commission Report. P. 153; see pp. 153-55
(setting out integration scheme).
13. Pp. 153, 155.
14. Pp. 153, 160-61.
15. Pp. 155-56. Note that Professor Clark's discussion assumes that the capital gains
preference too has been eliminated, see p. 155; its absence, however, does not affect
most of the projected results of the reform package.
16. P. 156.
17. Pp. 155-56.
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come allocated to the shareholder would increase the shareholder's basis.' 8
Prevention of bailouts that convert dividends to capital gains would no
longer be necessary, because the corporate withholding tax would have
subjected corporate income to the highest possible tax rate.19
Integrating the taxation of corporations and shareholders would not,
however, deal with another major source of complexity-the conversion
of unrealized appreciation of ordinary-income property at the corporate
level into capital gains at the shareholder level. Current law already deals
with this problem through the collapsible corporation provisions, which
convert the capital gain on the disposition of stock into ordinary income.20
Those provisions, however, are the source of a great deal of legal noise.
One method suggested by Professor Clark as a way to eliminate this prob-
lem is to abolish preferential tax treatment for capital gains. 21 It is not
apparent, however, why Professor Clark makes this suggestion a necessary
part of his promising reform package, 22 since he also proposes to prevent
the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains by recognizing gain
when property is distributed by the corporation.23 Abolition of the capital
gains preference is a sufficient but not a necessary method of eliminating
the legal noise in the collapsible corporation provisions, a point Pro-
fessor Clark seems to make earlier in his essay.24
18. Pp. 154-55.
19. P. 156. Professor Clark here refers to the partial elimination of "simple bailouts,"
by which he means devices for using the rule that dispositions of stock presumptively
produce capital gains to avoid the ordinary income tax on corporate distributions (pre-
sumptively dividends), often through the medium of a liquidation or redemption. See
p. 113 (defining "simple bailouts" as those not involving sixth or seventh principles),
pp. 111-16 (describing various types of simple bailouts).
20. I.R.C. § 341.
21. P. 146.
22. P. 155.
23. Pp. 160-61. The purchaser of stock who realized ordinary income on distribution
of appreciated corporate property would increase his basis if the taxation of corpora-
tions and shareholders were integrated, pp. 154-55, thereby creating a loss at the share-
holder level. If capital gains taxation were retained, however, this would be a capital
loss, most of which could not offset ordinary income, I.R.C. § 1211(3).
24. P. 152. Professor Clark makes one other point about his reform package that seems
unnecessary. He alludes to a tax avoidance potential resulting from the computational
disparity between corporate distributions, which are taxable without recovery of basis,
and dispositions, which are taxable after first allowing for recovery of basis. P. 157.
This disparity invites schemes for realizing gain at the shareholder level through trans-
actions that qualify for disposition-type treatment and creates, in Professor Clark's view,
the possibility of a "recovery of cost bailout," regardless of whether the property is a
capital asset. P. 157 9- n.231.
The supposed bailout technique can be illustrated using the figures in Professor Clark's
example at p. 158 n.235. A corporation has two items of property, one with a cost of $10,
which has appreciated to $50, and the other with a cost of $50, which has retained
its $50 value. The shareholder's basis in the stock is $60, which reflects the total cost
of the two items of property. If the shareholder sells half his stock for $50, the amount
realized is reduced by half his cost, $30, and he realizes a $20 gain. This treatment of
dispositions must be contrasted with a distribution of property by the corporation to
understand the bailout potential. Although Professor Clark does not give an example
of how a distribution would be taxed, he presumably would tax the value of the dis-
1321
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One could argue that, even if the corporation must recognize gain when
corporate property is distributed, preferential capital gains rates give the
selling shareholder an improper advantage by allowing him to deflect to
the purchaser the ordinary income represented by the gain in corporate
property. Although the collapsible corporation rules have always been
perceived as preventing conversion of ordinary income to capital gain,
not as preventing assignment of income, 25 a tax system that integrates the
taxation of corporations and shareholders ought to be particularly sen-
sitive to the assignment of ordinary income by one shareholder to another,
especially since the purchaser may be tax-exempt or have operating losses
to offset against corporate income attributable to shareholders. Accepting
this as a real concern, however, requires only that the corporate veil be
pierced to tax as ordinary income the shareholder's portion of the un-
realized gain on the corporation's ordinary-income property, a technique
employed by current law when partnership interests are sold,20 and that
rules be adopted to determine when a shareholder's activities convert cor-
porate capital gains into shareholder ordinary income, analogous to those
used for collapsible27 and Subchapter S28 corporations.
Of course, such rules are difficult enough to administer when business
entities are owned by a few investors; they would be virtually unadminis-
trable in the context of publicly owned businesses. It would be easier to
tribution to the shareholder without reduction for cost, because only then would dis-
tributions be taxed less favorably than dispositions.
The difficulty with this argument is that the distribution with which one must con-
trast the treatment of dispositions must, logically, be a distribution of the appreciated
property itself, and there is no apparent reason why an integrated system of taxing
corporations and shareholders should tax shareholders on the value of appreciated
property upon distribution. It seems more reasonable to treat earnings, if any, as
retained earnings and to treat the distribution of the appreciated property as an event
in which the shareholder steps into the corporation's shoes by taking over the corpora-
tion's basis. Indeed, that is precisely the method of taxing distributions of partnership
property. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(1), 732(a)(1). Because the distribution of appreciated property
would not be taxed less favorably than a sale of stock, there should be no potential
for a recovery of cost bailout.
Perhaps Professor Clark is concerned with the taxpayer's avoiding tax on the appre-
ciated gain in the property, which cost $10 and is now worth $50, upon sale of his
stock. It is true that, if the corporation sold all the property and distributed the gain,
the shareholder would realize income of $40. But the shareholder does not sell the
property itself: he sells half the corporation, represented by half the stock. It is thus more
accurate to compare the sale of stock to the sale of half of each item of property, rather
than to the sale of all the appreciated property. If half of each item of corporate property
were sold, the corporation would realize a $20 gain ($25 of income minus $5 of basis
for the appreciated item; plus $25 of income minus $25 of basis for the nonappreciated
item); this is equal to the realized gain on the sale of half the stock. There is therefore
no reason to view the recovery of cost on the sale of stock as a bailout scheme.
Underlying Professor Clark's comments may simply be a concern with the failure of
existing law to tax unrealized appreciation; taxing unrealized gains, however, is a reform
that goes well beyond modifying the corporate tax culture.
25. A selling shareholder can claim capital gains treatment if the corporation has
elected to recognize gain on distribution of the property. I.R.C. § 341().
26. Id. § 751.
27. Id. § 341(e).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-1(d).
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eliminate the capital gains preference and be done with these complexities.
But the capital gains preference, as Professor Clark notes,29 is an inde-
pendent principle, not limited to the corporate context. Its elimination
would alter the general tax culture as well as the corporate tax system
in major ways, a tactic Professor Clark rejects in another setting.30 There
is nothing wrong with effecting such sweeping changes in the general tax
law to reduce legal noise. But once we admit to changes in the general
tax culture as a technique for reducing legal noise in the corporate tax
system, there is no reason to limit our concern to the capital gains pref-
erence-a point to which I will return below.
II. What Legal Noise Would Be Reduced?
My comments so far have accepted the specific simplification objectives
posited by Professor Clark, which aim to eliminate planning and auditing
complexities that concern a fairly small class of taxpayers. 31 Most gov-
ernment officials would probably emphasize a different concept of sim-
plification-the reduction of computation problems for large numbers of
taxpayers.32 The paradigmatic reform to deal with this type of complexity
is the standard deduction,3 3 which in effect leaves large numbers of tax-
payers out of the general tax culture by eliminating the advantage of
itemizing deductions. The problem raised by Professor Clark's reform pack-
age is that it may abandon the computational simplicity of the existing
system to reduce tax planning and audit complexity.
The source of the problem is integrating the taxation of corporations
and shareholders. Complete integration would pass through the attributes
of income, deductions, and credits from the corporation to the shareholder,
in a manner similar to the partnership3 4 and trust3 5 rules. "Pass-through"
of corporate tax attributes is important for two reasons. First, preferentially
taxed income must retain its preference in the hands of shareholders (that
is, the preference must be passed through to shareholders) if the objective
of reforming the corporate tax culture is limited to simplification and
not expanded to encompass a general restructuring of the tax law.3 6 Sec-
29. P. 105.
30. P. 160.
31. The main targets for simplification are the schemes adopted by closely held cor-
porations to reduce taxes: disguising dividends as salary or rent; retaining earnings to
avoid tax on dividends; avoiding double taxation on sale and liquidation of a business;
bailing out dividends as capital gains; and converting unrealized ordinary income to
realized capital gains. Pp. 155-61. The number of shareholders concerned with these
schemes is small compared to that of shareholders of publicly held corporations.
32. See, e.g., Woodworth, Tax Simplification and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 34
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 711 (1969).
33. The new term is "zero bracket amount," I.R.C. § 63(d).
34. Id. § 702; Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1.
35. I.RC. §§ 652(b), 662(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.652(b)-2, 1.662(b).
36. One proposal for integrating the taxation of corporations and shareholders con-
sidered eliminating or reducing tax preferences. Committee on Corporations of the Tax
Section of the New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on the Integration of Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes, 31 TAx LAw. 37, 42-45 (1977) thereinafter cited as Report on
Integration of Taxes].
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ond, avoidance of limitations on various tax preferences by using the
corporate form of doing business must be prevented; otherwise, integration
would introduce a bias in favor of corporations. Such limitations would
be avoided if the attributes of corporate income, deductions, and credits
were not passed through to shareholders. 37
"Complete" integration, with mandatory pass-through of preferences and
limitations, would require a radical change in the shareholder's obligation
to compute his tax. One of the major simplifying provisions of existing
law is its use of corporate earnings and profits to define dividends; this
in effect homogenizes different types of income so that the shareholder
need report only "dividend" income. By contrast, complete integration
would insist that the shareholder identify the following types of income
on his return: income subject to special tax rates, such as tax-exempt in-
come or capital gains; special deductions, such as depletion and accelerated
depreciation; and tax credits, such as the investment tax credit. The com-
plexities of such reporting have led recent commentators on integration
proposals to reject such a system,38 a position with which Professor Clark
should agree, given his concern with the administrative problems of pierc-
ing the corporate veil.3 9
A modified form of integration would avoid many, though not all, of
the reporting complexities but could be accomplished only if the problem
of favoring the corporate form of doing business were disregarded, and
the only objective were to pass through the advantages of tax preferences.
Most tax advantages are passed through to shareholders simply by accept-
ing the corporation's computation of income as the shareholder's income.
Assume, for example, a corporation with $100 of tax-exempt income, $100
of income eligible for a $20 depletion allowance, and a $20 accelerated
37. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 613(a) (ceiling on depletion equal to 50% of taxpayer's taxable
income), 617(h) (specific dollar ceiling on current deduction of mining exploration ex-
penditures), 46(a)(3) (dollar limit on investment credit).
The failure to pass through these items is inconsistent with the imputation of tax
preference items to shareholders of Subchapter S corporations for purposes of the
minimum tax, id. § 58(d)(1). Subchapter S corporations also pass through to shareholders
eligibility for the investment credit, id. § 48(e), and capital gains, id. § 1375(a).
38. 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION 676-77 (1966) (Canada); McClure,
Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent
Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975). I have used the term "complete
integration" to mean the fullest possible integration, which passes through to the share-
holder all corporate income attributes. See pp. 1223-24 supra. McClure clearly rejects such a
"partnership approach" on the ground of administrative infeasibility, though he con-
siders it the "most desirable [conceptual] approach," see McClure, supra at 562-64.
McClure uses the term "complete integration" to describe a number of integration
methods in order to distinguish them from "partial" or "dividends-only" integration,
see id. at 549-61, 581; he ultimately urges "complete integration" in a form similar to
that proposed by the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission),
see id. at 573 & n.161, 581, which likewise disapproved the partnership method, see 4
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, supra. Cf. Report on Integration of
Taxes, supra note 36, at 37-39, 63 (describing alternative forms of integration; noting
that no industrialized country now uses "fully integrated" system; and concluding that
such system appears infeasible).
39. P. 108-10.
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deduction for intangible drilling expenses. Corporate income is $60. If we
disregard any limitations on the shareholder's eligibility for tax advan-
tages, $60 would also be the shareholder's income. If, in addition, the $60
had been invested in machinery eligible for a 10% investment credit, the
corporate withholding tax at the highest individual tax rate would be $36
(70% X $60 $ 42, less a $6 credit). The shareholder would obtain the
advantage of the investment credit simply by taking a withholding tax
credit of $42-the withholding tax without reduction for the investment
credit.40
But a modified form of integration such as that described above would
not pass through the limitations on tax preferences, for the limitations
operate only at the shareholder level. Such a system, then, would neces-
sarily favor the corporate form of doing business. Nor could pass-through
of the tax advantages for income taxed at special rates, such as capital
gains, be accomplished without separate reporting of such items. And the
use of the corporation's income to measure the shareholder's income would
still mean that shareholder income remained tentative until an audit of
the corporation's tax return had been completed.41
Perhaps we should be concerned with the problem of favoring the cor-
porate form of doing business only when the owners of the corporation
appear to have manipulated the tax system to achieve an advantage, that
is, when the entity is owned by a few shareholders rather than by the
general public. A mandatory pass-through of all corporate tax attributes
would then be required only for owners of Subchapter S type corporations,
and the tax law would in effect recognize two corporate tax cultures. 42 But
such a system would have the drawback of introducing considerable legal
noise as taxpayers struggled to come within the most favorable corporate
tax regime.
III. A Consumption Tax: An Alternative Method of
Reducing Legal Noise
Since there is no easy way to simplify the corporate tax culture without
modifying the general tax culture, such as by repealing the capital gains
preference or allowing the ceilings on tax advantages to be circumvented,
we should allow our imaginations to roam even farther than Professor
Clark has suggested and consider what major changes in the general tax
structure might radically simplify the corporate tax system. One such change
is the adoption of a consumption tax: a tax on income minus savings.
40. Assume the individual's tax rate is 50%. With a $6 tax credit, his net tax should
be $24 (50% $60 = $30, minus $6). A corporate tax of 70% minus a $6 credit results
in a withholding tax payment of $36 (70% X $60 = $42, minus $6). The shareholder,
however, would report a withholding tax payment of $42 (70% X $60); this would
result in a refund of $12 ($42 minus $30). The $12 refund reduces the $36 corporate tax
payment to a net tax of $24.
41. One proposal would allocate audit adjustments to shareholders in the year of
the adjustments. U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPMNTS FOR TAX REFORm 74 (1977).
42. Cf. H. GuhipL, WORLD TAX SERiEs: TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY § 12/2.1a, .lb, at 3019-25 (Harvard Univ. Int'l Program in Taxation 1969) (pub-
licly and nonpublicly owned corporations taxed differently).
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Professor Andrews has already explained how a consumption tax4 3 can
simplify the general tax system, but its advantages in simplifying the cor-
porate tax culture should not be overlooked. The corporate tax would be
abolished, for corporate income would be savings from the individual share-
holder's perspective.4 4 Without a double tax on dividends, there would
be no incentive to disguise dividends. Penalty taxes on retained earnings
would be unnecessary, because there would be no bias against savings in
the form of retained earnings. No Subchapter S elections would be neces-
sary, because there would be no corporate tax to avoid. Bailouts would
not be a problem if the capital gains preference were eliminated, a step
that would reasonably follow once savings had received the benefit of a
full deduction. And recovery of cost problems would not exist, for cost
basis, which is previously taxed savings, would not exist. A consumption
tax would carry its own potential for legal noise, however, because it would
heighten the need for a tax on the enjoyment derived from wealth.4 5
And efforts to measure wealth periodically would require a major restruc-
turing of tax administration, 4 6 albeit one that many other countries have
attempted.47
Conclusion
Professor Clark's essay demonstrates the analytical power derived from
understanding endogenous legal evolution. It is difficult, however, to con-
tain a discussion of the corporate tax culture within "comparatively clear
boundaries," 48 as my discussion of the capital gains preference should
illustrate.4 9 When we begin to think seriously about reform to reduce
legal noise, the linkages between the corporate tax subculture and the
broader tax culture cannot be overlooked.
William D. Popkin
Professor of Law
Indiana University School of Law
(Bloomington)
43. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1113, 1148-50 (1974).
44. The corporate tax might persist, however, on the theory that major conglomerations
of power should be taxed. Cf. I.R.C. § 4940 (taxing investment income of private
foundations).
45. Andrews, supra note 43, at 1169-73.
46. Id. at 1141-43.
47. See C. SANDFORD, TAXING PERSONAL WEALTH 186-87 (1971).
48. P. 91.
49. See pp. 1321-23 supra. See also note 24 supra (discussing taxation of unrealized
appreciation).
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Author's Reply:
I was delighted to read Professor Popkin's illuminating observations1
about my recent article.2 His comments fall into three distinct categories,
and I should like to respond to each.
I. Capital Gains
Professor Popkin states that it is not apparent why I urge abolition of
the capital gains preference as a "necessary part" of my tentative reform
package.3 His statement could mean only that in my article I did not
show clearly how this would make a significant contribution to simplicity
in the corporate tax culture, independently of the contributions made by
the other elements of my package. I accept this criticism. My analysis of
the implications of the package was fairly global, not oriented to tracing
the exact contributions of each component.
Professor Popkin's statement might also mean that abolition of the
capital gains preference would not in fact make a significant independent
contribution to simplicity. This interpretation I reject. I do not think
that Professor Popkin really disagrees, for he himself discusses two con-
siderations that argue persuasively for abolition of the preference. First,
he notes that the rate differential presents certain assignment-of-income
problems.4 Initially, he says that this concern requires "only" certain veil-
piercing adjustments, but, after referring to three analogically relevant
patterns in existing law (in the partnership, Subchapter S, and collapsible
corporation areas) and confessing that they generate a lot of legal noise,
he admits that abolition of the capital gains preference may well be the
preferable route for avoiding these complexities. 5 Second, his discussion in
Part II of his letter correctly points out the computational complexities
that the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income, as well as
the need to determine whether and how these characterizations should
be passed through to shareholders, might create in an integrated tax sys-
tem.0 My article nowhere defines the simplicity objective to exclude these
sorts of complexities, and I certainly would not want to rule them out of
my concern. This second consideration, then, reinforces my recommenda-
tion that capital gains be abolished.
A third reason for thinking that abolition of the capital gains preference
would itself promote simplicity was not made explicit in my article and
is not addressed in Professor Popkin's comment. To make the point re-
quires a running start. Professor Popkin's core intuition in Part I of his
letter is twofold. He first notes that, given a complete integration scheme
1. Popkin, Correspondence, 87 YALE L.J. 1319 (1978) [hereinafter cited without cross
reference as Popkin].
2. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YA.E LJ. 90 (1977) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
3. Popkin at 1321.
4. Id. at 1322.
5. Id. at 1322-23.
6. Id. at 1323-25.
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with appropriate stock-basis adjustments, the incentive to engage in what
I call simple bailouts is virtually destroyed.7 Second, given a complete in-
tegration scheme plus either abolition of the capital gains preference or
reversal of the General Utilities principle,8 collapsible bailouts are vir-
tually destroyed.9 Professor Popkin thus concludes that "[a]bolition of the
capital gains preference is a sufficient but not a necessary method of elim-
inating the legal noise in the collapsible corporation provisions."'10
This twofold insight is basically correct, and a very good one. Never-
theless, the second point applies only to amounts of tax; it slights the
importance of timing. Given an integration scheme and a reversal of
General Utilities, a shareholder ultimately would bear the same amount
of tax, regardless of whether he cashed in on unrealized appreciation in
his corporation's assets by a stock disposition or by a distribution. Never-
theless, the shareholder might reap a significant tax deferral advantage
by resorting to a transaction yielding disposition-type treatment. Adding
abolition of the capital gains preference to the combination of integration
plus reversal of the General Utilities principle, however, would preclude
the shareholder from getting this deferral benefit." I doubt that I need
7. Popkin at 1320-21, 1321 n.19.
8. See pp. 130-35 (setting out General Utilities principle and its present ramifications);
p. 152 (describing consequences of reversing General Utilities principle alone).
9. Nonrecognition bailouts pose more complicated problems, which Professor Popkin
does not consider. See p. 1329 & note 13 infra.
10. Popkin at 1321.
11. Suppose that a complete integration scheme were adopted and that General
Utilities were reversed. Shareholder S, who has marginal tax rates of 50% for ordinary
income and 25% for capital gains, has formed corporation X. He originally contributed
$200 and received all 200 shares issued by the company. The purchased assets now
have a fair market value of $300. Compare the following tax patterns:
Pattern A: Asset Sale and Liquidation
X sells the assets, which produce $100 of ordinary income, retains the income,
and allocates it to S. After the integration technique has been applied-X's payment
of a $70 withholding tax, the grossed-up constructive dividend to S, the credit to S,
and the refund to him of $20 (all described at pp. 154-55)-S will bear a $50 tax
burden; his shares will get a step-up in basis to $230, and X will possess $230. If S
liquidates X, currently or in the future, then assuming nothing else changes, neither
he nor X will have gain or loss on the liquidation. The tax burden for this cor-
porate asset sale-liquidation sequence is as follows:
Current year: $50 to S
Future year: $0 to S.
Pattern B: Stock Sale and Liquidation-Capital Gains Preference Retained
S sells his stock for $300 and pays a capital gains tax of $25 on his $100 gain.
Several years later, the buyer, P, who has the same tax rates as S, liquidates the
corporation. Because General Utilities has been reversed, the liquidating distribution
of the appreciated property will produce $100 of corporate-level ordinary income.
Thus the liquidating distribution will have two parts: an actual distribution worth
$100, on which P will pay a $50 tax; and a nondividend distribution worth 5200,
which, because of P's $300 stock basis, will generate a $100 capital loss. Assuming that
P has capital gains income to offset, this will produce a $25 tax saving. Thus the
pattern of net tax burdens is as follows:
Current year: $25 to S
Future year: $25 to P.
Pattern C: Stock Sale and Liquidation-Capital Gains Preference Abolished
1328
Correspondence
stress here that one should not think of deferral problems as involving
"mere" deferral; the issue of timing is, after all, the source of countless
conflicts in the tax culture.12
A fourth reason for abolishing the capital gains preference is that doing
so would simplify the tax system's response to nonrecognition bailouts,' 3
the one category of my three that Professor Popkin does not analyze. More-
over, there are reasons other than simplification for abolishing the capital
gains preference; the primary one is that the preference makes no concep-
tual or policy sense in the first place. Though simplicity was the major
concern of the final part of my article, it is hardly the only value that
motivated the construction of the reform package.
Professor Popkin also seems to think it unnecessary for me to have
bothered to worry about computational disparities between dispositions
and distributions in an integrated tax scheme.' 4 The extended discussion
S sells his stock for $300 and pays an ordinary income tax of $50 on his $100
gain. Several years later P, with the same tax rates, liquidates X. Again, the liqui-
dating distribution will produce SlOO of corporate-level income ($300, the value of the
assets, minus S200, the corporation's basis); P will pay a $50 tax on the dividend
distribution and will have a $100 loss on the nondividend distribution. Thus far the
results are identical to those in Pattern B. But because the capital gains preference
has been abolished in this example, P's $100 loss will be an ordinary loss; he will thus
enjoy a .50 tax saving, which exactly offsets his $50 tax on the corporate-level in-
come. (The several distinct analytic steps in this example would actually occur
simultaneously; one could collapse these steps instead of tracing the treatment of the
corporate-level income, but the result would be the same.) The pattern of net tax
burdens is as follows:
Current year: $50 to S.
Future year: $0 to P.
Pattern C is like Pattern A. Pattern B produces the same amount of tax as the other
two patterns, but half the tax is deferred for an indefinite period of time. Abolition of
the capital gains preference precludes such deferral. In addition, the example assumes
that P's tax rates are equal to S's only to eliminate assignment-of-income problems and
thereby to emphasize that the point about deferral benefits is a distinct one.
12. For a succinct explanation of why this is true, see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 5 & n.4 (1977).
13. For instance, the advantage of a Gregory-type bailout scheme, described at pp.
120-23, could virtually be destroyed by any reversal of the General Utilities principle
that was so extreme as to apply to all spin-off distributions. But, assuming that business-
motivated spin-offs generally ought to be given nonrecognition treatment even when
appreciated property is transferred to the spun-off company, this approach would throw
the baby out with the bath water. Consequently, something like the complex conditions
of present § 355 would still be needed. See pp. 122-23, 123 n.134. By contrast, abol-
ishing the capital gains preference on the stock-sale component of the Gregory se-
quence would destroy the advantages of the scheme much more simply. A contemplation
of the other nonrecognition bailouts, described at pp. 117-20, 123-30, will indicate that
abolishing the capital gains preference would frequently take the fun (and profit) out
of these devices in a simpler way than would either the present system's safeguard
provisions or a reversal of General Utilities that realistically accommodated nonrecogni-
tion policies. The nonrecognition bailouts thus constitute a fourth independent reason
for abolishing the capital gains preference.
14. See Popkin at 1321 n.24. More precisely, Professor Popkin disputes what he
thinks to be my argument: that there would be potential for a "recovery of cost bailout."
In the first place, the problem to which I was alluding in my article was not described
by me as a bailout, for it does not meet my definition of "bailout"-it does not involve
conversion.of ordinary income into capital gains. See pp. 95 n.13, 105. Moreover, Professor
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of this problem in my article suggested that the problem, which of course
exists in the present system, is not feasibly solvable. 15 It is easy to supply
a numerical example to demonstrate that the disparity will continue to
Popkin goes on in the same footnote to set forth a numerical example of mine and
explicitly supposes that I "presumably would tax the value of the distribution to the
shareholder without reduction for cost, because only then would distributions be taxed
less favorably than dispositions." He then proceeds to argue that it "seems more rea-
sonable" to treat distributions of appreciated property as events in which the shareholder
steps into the corporation's shoes by taking over its basis.
Since I am puzzled by the quoted language, I will here describe how a distribution
of appreciated property would be treated under my package. Consider the example of
mine that Professor Popkin restates and the following three courses of action by S.
(1) S causes X to distribute Asset B, the nonappreciated asset worth $50, to himself. X
obviously has no gain or loss. Neither does S, for, even in the new system, distributions
would have to come out of corporate income to be taxable to shareholders. The basis of
S's shares is, however, reduced by $50, as it would be under the present system.
(2) S sells half his stock for $50. He has gain, taxable as ordinary income, of $20.
(3) X distributes Asset A, the appreciated asset worth $50 and with a corporate basis
of $10, to S. Because General Utilities has been reversed, X recognizes income of $40.
Because the distribution of the property constitutes a distribution of this income, S, after
application of the integration procedure, in effect bears a tax at his marginal rate on
$40. The basis of S's shares is reduced by $10.
To me, it is a matter of regret that these three ways of producing what would be
$50 of benefit in a no-tax world would be taxed differently in the new system. S would
clearly prefer path (1) to path (2) and path (2) to path (3); there is a lack of tax neutrality.
Furthermore, if S had to choose path (2) for nontax reasons, he might try to make it
look like path (1) by staging the sale as a redemption of half his stock by the corporation;
he would then claim distribution-type treatment. In such a situation, the present sys-
tem's problem of characterizing redemptions as sale-equivalent or distribution-equivalent
would persist. These problems cannot be made to disappear, in my view, by asserting
that it is "more accurate [metaphysically? poetically?] to compare the sale of stock to
the sale of half of each item of property, rather than to the sale of all the appreciated
property." Popkin at 1322 n.24.
Professor Popkin does make an excellent point when he suggests that distributions of
property (other than money, of course) be given nonrecognition treatment, by analogy
to the current treatment of partnership distributions. Id. (One might also draw an
analogy to I.R.C. § 333.) To be sure, this would in one sense merely change the neutrality
and characterization problems: paths (1) and (3) would then normally be preferred to
path (2), but, when the corporation held property that had depreciated in value, the
shareholders might stage distributions as redemptions and claim sale-type treatment in
order to recognize a loss. But at least the neutrality problem seems an illusory one if
we really accept the theory behind nonrecognition treatment: paths (1) and (3) are
different from path (2) because they involve merely formal changes of ownership. Pro-
fessor Popkin's suggestion, which in its largest aspect amounts to nonreversal of General
Utilities plus expansion of the sixth (nonrecognition) principle, involves more ramifica-
tions, and more ambiguities needing resolution, than I can discuss here. It may indeed
be the case that his suggestion would be an element in a tax-reform package superior
to the one I have suggested.
In any event, unlike Professor Popkin, I persist in seeing a "recovery-of-cost-first"
problem in my proposed system. Obviously I do not think it so serious that I would
reject the reform package. Indeed, my position is, practically speaking, quite similar to
Professor Popkin's: I would proceed despite the problem, whereas he believes it does
not exist. I must point out, however, that "recovery of cost first" is not the only
problematic aspect of the present computational disparity between distributions and
dispositions that would persist in the new system. My article pointed out another as
well, which is addressed in note 16 infra.
15. See pp. 157-60.
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be a problem, albeit, hopefully, a small one, even after the adoption of
an integration scheme or of my complete package. 16
II. Concepts of Simplicity
In dealing with the legal noise that reform might reduce, my article
focused on the time and expense devoted to advising, planning, litigating,
and teaching the law governing transactions that invoke the uncertain
consequences of, or the inherent tensions among, the system's basic postu-
lates. Professor Popkin summarizes these costs as "planning and audit com-
plexities" and contrasts them with the computational complexities faced
by all corporations and shareholders routinely filling out their tax returns.17
He is worried that an integration scheme would increase computational
costs more than it would reduce the "planning and audit" costs.' 8 I feel
much less worried. To put it graphically, if simplistically, he is worried
about adding more lines to the reporting forms and keeping more records;
I am worried about adding more pages to Bittker and Eustice's treatise
and more items to the case law annotations in the loose-leaf services.
Neither of us, however, has offered any cogent empirical evidence to sup-
port our predilections. We are in the lawyer's familiar world of a priori
discussion. I can adduce only a few debater's points here.
Though all corporations and shareholders have to prepare tax returns,
it does not necessarily follow that the computational complexities of in-
tegration would be terribly expensive. For example, if all that were in-
volved were the records and computations needed for carrying out the
gross-up, credit, and stock basis adjustment features of the integration
scheme, expenses need not be significant. The manipulations would be
complex but could be routinized. It is not appropriate to refer to the
Treasury Department's concern about the standard deduction and sim-
plicity on individual tax returns as a paradigm;' 9 most affected taxpayers
16. The example in note 14 supra focused on appreciated corporate property. The
same type of problem, traceable to the computational disparity, would exist with respect
to corporate earnings. The key is to focus on a case in which earnings are retained but
not allocated. Suppose that S, a shareholder with a marginal tax rate of 50%, contributes
$200 to his corporation X in return for its 200 shares. X eventually earns $100, but the
income is not allocated. X pays a withholding tax of $70, it holds $30 of net retained
earnings, and S's stock basis of $200 is not changed. Several years later, S wants to cash
in on the value of the retained earnings.
If X declares a dividend of $30, the dividend is grossed-up, a $70 credit is given, and S
receives a $20 refund. There is no stock basis adjustment. See pp. 154-55 (explaining
computations under integration technique). If, instead, S sells enough stock to yield
$30 of sales proceeds-i.e., 26.08 shares: the desired income of $30, divided by $230 (the
value of the company)-he will realize a taxable gain of $30 minus $26.08, or $3.92,
and will pay a tax of $1.96. Thus the new system would contain a bias, in this hopefully
infrequent situation, in favor of distribution-type treatment over disposition-type treat-
ment. My article clearly acknowledged this, and noted that at least there would be no
policy reason to require the Service to try to prevent taxpayers from casting transactions
as distributions. P. 156.
17. Popkin at 1323.
18. Id. at 1323-25.
19. Id. at 1323.
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would undoubtedly have an accountant already assisting the preparation
of their returns, and most accountants would not be fazed by the com-
putations. A key fact is that taxpayers would not have to understand the
integration procedure: the tax forms could and surely would present an
algorithm for taking the preparer through the computation, step by step.
Existing law and forms suggest many analogies. For example, the pro-
visions for income averaging 20 are, linguistically, fairly complex, and many
taxpayers who use them may only dimly understand their basic purpose
and may not understand their particular strategy at all. The form for in-
come averaging is also complicated but so methodical and explicit that it
requires only obedience, not thought, to complete it.21 Thus, although the
statutory averaging provisions are indeed complex in a linguistic sense,
they do not generate transaction costs in the way that, say, the phrase
"reasonable needs of the business" does in the accumulated earnings tax
provisions.22 When the averaging provisions do generate transaction costs,
it is probably because of ambiguities in the key terms of the statute, not
because of linguistic complexity or the complexity of the calculations re-
quired. Ambiguity and tensions among basic principles are the real sources
of expensive complexity, that is, of "legal noise."2 3
On the other side of the pair, the planning and litigating costs of the
corporate tax culture that I focused on in my article can be extremely
expensive. Legal advice to aid the planning of a transaction invoking am-
biguities or conflicting principles can easily cost thousands of dollars; liti-
gation expenses in a single case can equally easily involve tens or hundreds
of thousands of dollars. And, though litigation may affect a small pro-
portion of corporations and shareholders, legal planning is quite frequent
in connection with stock redemptions (as, for example, in close corporations
after the death of a major shareholder), liquidations, and sales of a business.
To be sure, Professor Popkin has in mind computational complexities
far more subtle than those necessarily inherent in a full integration scheme.
Many problems would arise from the desire to "pass through" preferences
and to prevent the circumvention of limitations on preferences. As Professor
Popkin recognizes, one source of trouble in this context is the capital gains
preference, which I would abolish.2 4 I would also abolish many of the
other preferences, for reasons unrelated to improvements in the corporate
tax culture. Furthermore, many of the "complexities" that one would face
when drafting an integration scheme into a concrete statute, such as those
presented by the tax preference provisions, are in the first instance merely
questions that the legislator must answer in one way or another, to the
sacrifice of some current policy concerns. As a recent and rather detailed
analysis by Professor Alvin Warren shows, 25 how the questions are answered
20. I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305.
21. Thought is generally more time-consuming than obedience.
22. See pp. 103-04.
23. This is a key point of my article, see, e.g., pp. 116-17.
24. See p. 1327 & note 6 supra.
25. A. Warren, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes (unpublished
paper prepared for ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional Education, Confer-
ence on Federal Income Tax Simplification, undated) (on file with Yale Law Journalo.
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may have a significant impact on the level of reporting and computational
complexity. Nevertheless, I must admit that Professor Popkin has made a
good case that, if we want to retain some tax preferences and would be
worried by circumventions of limitations on them, we have to make an
unavoidable trade-off between reporting and computational complexities
(which would arise from "passing through") and biases in favor of the
corporate form (which would arise from not "passing through"). In any
event, I would not, as Professor Popkin suggests I would, 26 impose on re-
form proposals any general prohibition against changing the general in-
come tax culture. I simply refrain from trying to do everything in one
article.
I would add one comment about different types of simplicity and the
differing roles they play in cultural explanations and reform analyses. In
exploring the evolution of a legal culture, all types of simplicity or com-
plexity are of interest. In the reform area, however, what counts is expen-
sive complexity, which I tried to capture with the term "legal noise." In
my view, it is proper for reformers not to be anxious to achieve linguistic
and calculational simplicity per se, particularly in the corporate area (or,
for that matter, wherever the advice of accountants is presumably already
available). The bulk and intricacy of the Code and regulations should
not worry us very much. If every Code section were ten pages long, filled
with lists of conditions and qualifications, but generated no uncertainty
of application and no litigation, the world would be a far better place
than it is now. What are important are fundamental ambiguities and
conflicts, which stem from deep-level theoretical disharmonies.
III. A Discourse on Method
Professor Popkin's most interesting point is that switching from an in-
come tax to a consumption tax might effectively simplify the corporate
tax culture.2 7 Perhaps so, perhaps not. I would rather have a more com-
plete argument before I cease to worry about hidden complexities not
now apparent. One of the major themes of my article, as its conclusion
stressed, is the importance of method in the analysis of reforms-in par-
ticular, the importance of an axiomatic method. I would therefore suggest
the following experiment, to be carried out by some interested tax analyst.28
Formulate a list of the basic principles or axioms of a consumption tax
system, especially as they would apply to corporations and shareholders.
Preferably, the formulation would be cast in statutory form. Then present
the imaginary code to experienced tax lawyers and accountants and per-
haps to a group of intelligent laymen. Assign them roles: some as various
sorts of taxpayers, some as Internal Revenue officials, some as judges, and
26. Popkin at 1319, 1325.
27. Id. at 1325-26. But cf. id. at 1326 (consumption tax might introduce new sources
of legal noise).
28. A note to the world: I am willing to receive a grant for this experiment; I'll
gladly split it with Professor Popkin.
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some as Congressmen. Ask a pair 29 of taxpayers to begin the game by de-
vising a plan to reduce taxes. A pair of Internal Revenue officials next
has a chance to argue against it and to write a prospectively applicable
regulation to try to bar other taxpayers from a similar move. A pair of
judges then decides how the conflict should be resolved, and the winner
gets real money (supplied by the experimenters), though not, of course,
in real-life proportions. A pair of Congressmen then has a chance, though
not an obligation, to write a new statute, but not one that changes the
system's basic postulates. Play is continued for many hours. A simulation
technique of this sort might be a good way to predict the evolution of a
consumption tax system.
Professor Popkin's suggestion that we let our imaginations roam beyond
the limits explored in my article30 raises another question, a more general
one than whether his proposed consumption tax would in fact simplify
the corporate tax culture: what should determine, in any given inquiry
into tax policy issues, the limits within which we roam? Obviously, dif-
ferences in degrees of "fundamentalness" can be very great. One could
easily roam beyond even Professor Popkin's suggestion: if we consider the
consumption tax and simplicity, why not consider a value-added tax, or
a head tax, and so forth? Why not consider the propriety of having any
tax system at all? Why not consider the ultimate assumptions of the dis-
cussion, assumptions that realistically must be justified, if at all, in a
philosophy of the state and of human nature, or in metaphysics and
epistemology?
Policy analysis suffers from a perennial need to choose between two
conflicting approaches. It can try to take account of all the obviously
relevant variables and all the obviously relevant alternative solutions to
problems. In this way, its general descriptions of relationships will be more
realistic, and its conclusion may embody a better and more novel overall
solution. Or it can exercise self-restraint, by self-consciously stipulating
that some variables are constant and ruling out certain alternatives in
advance, and then proceed to draw out the implications of its self-created
model to the fullest possible extent. The advantage of this second tack
is that (within the model, of course) one may discover or formulate in-
teresting and perhaps not previously apparent relationships and reach
conclusions accordingly. Like the physicist assuming friction to be zero
in order to be able to conduct a thought experiment, or the economic
analyst stipulating counterfactual conditions or fixed values of variables
that he knows vary in the real world, the procedure enables systematic
analysis. This approach is to be favored, I suggest, especially since the
restrictive conditions can always be lifted in a later analytic inquiry. The
29. Groups are generally better at problem-solving tasks (as opposed to constructive
or synthesizing activities) than is a series of individuals working alone. See, e.g., P.
BLAu 8& W. Scowr, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 117 (1962) (discussing empirical studies). Thus
it would be extremely important that players in my experiment work as teams, just
as real-life taxpayers and their lawyers and accountants do. Otherwise, the generation
of tax-reduction schemes might be discouragingly slow.
30. Popkin at 1325.
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right time for me to ask about a consumption tax as an alternative to
the income tax is precisely now, after Morphogenesis has appeared and
many comments on it received.
I am concerned about assuming that if one restrictive condition of anal-
ysis is lifted, others should be lifted simultaneously. Professor Popkin
remarks that "once we admit to changes in the general tax culture as a
technique for reducing legal noise in the corporate tax system, there is
no need to limit our concern to the capital gains preference." 3' 1 There
seems to me to be a very big difference between a proposal to abolish
the capital gains preference in the income tax culture and a proposal to
establish a consumption tax culture. For one thing, the former seems
much more feasible, politically,3 2 and is therefore a more natural variable
to consider changing in a first inquiry. More important, I feel reasonably
confident, even without going through a systematic analysis, that abolishing
the capital gains preference would also simplify the general income tax
culture; the effect there would be consistent with my goals in the corporate
tax area. Establishing a consumption tax would, as Professor Popkin him-
self points out, create various complexities and possibilities for legal noise.33
Without conducting an axiomatic analysis, I cannot be sure of the net ef-
fect; I therefore view the change as a subject for separate, later analysis.
Everything in its own time.
Robert C. Clark
Visiting Professor of Law
Harvard University
31. Id. at 1323.
32. Before 1921, the preference did not exist in the income tax culture; its form has
changed radically since then; and last year there was a serious though unsuccessful effort
by the Administration to abolish it. See pp. 104-05, 104 n.61 (summarizing history of
capital gains preference and citing sources).
33. Popkin at 1326.
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